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In Education After Dewey, Paul Fairfield advocates a philosophy of education that 
combines John Dewey’s thinking with ideas drawn from continental European 
philosophy and 20th century social theory. In particular, Fairfield argues that 
putting Dewey in conversation with philosophers such as Hans-Georg Gadamer 
and Martin Heidegger can lead to needed improvements in contemporary ideas 
about education. Education after Dewey seeks to rehabilitate Dewey’s thought for 
students of European philosophy and for humanities educators. It argues for the 
merits, and concedes the limitations, of Dewey’s educational emphasis on experi-
ence. The many connections that Fairfield establishes between Dewey’s educational 
thinking and the works of Continental European philosophers is a boon to Dewey 
studies, and his argument that we need better ideas about education should find 
adherents among contemporary Deweyans and humanists generally.
Education After Dewey is divided into two parts. The first three chapters, on 
“The Educative Process,” begin by establishing the relevance of Dewey’s philosophy 
in the context of contemporary educational practice. These longer chapters then 
discuss how resources found in Gadamer’s and Heidegger’s philosophies can im-
prove Dewey’s conceptions of experience and thinking. In the book’s second part, 
six shorter chapters on “Education in the Human Sciences” address educational 
issues in philosophy, religion, ethics, politics, history, and literature. These chapters 
do not merely apply Dewey’s philosophy to contemporary teaching practice; they 
also explore and extend Dewey’s ideas through dialogue with Friedrich Nietzsche, 
John Caputo, Hannah Arendt, Paolo Freire, Michel Foucault, and Paul Ricoeur.
Chapter 1 establishes educational philosophy—and particularly Dewey’s 
educational philosophy—as a critical resource for contemporary educational re-
form. Beginning with a brief history of Dewey’s criticisms of both child-centered 
progressives and curriculum-focused traditionalists, Fairfield asserts that Dewey 
remains relevant to what he characterizes as today’s outworn educational de-
bates, specifically, over “oppositions of student-centered or curriculum-centered 
education, critical thinking or factual knowledge, [or] active or passive learning.”1 
He dismisses scientistic approaches to educational research and practice, contend-
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ing that these flawed models of scientific and economic rationality already dominate 
school learning. He also critiques the proposals of Allan Bloom and E.D. Hirsch. 
These educational conservatives argue that schools fail to adequately acculturate 
young people, but they misconceive acculturation as the accumulation of informa-
tion or as a process of normalization. Instead, as Dewey’s educational philosophy 
makes clear, learning itself is acculturative, and education is “entirely consistent 
with the basic human practice of making ourselves at home in the world through 
understanding.”2 Fairfield argues that philosophy can aid in making experience 
(not vocational preparation or other external ends) the model for school learning.
Chapter 2 develops Dewey’s focus on experience in education by putting 
Dewey in conversation with Gadamer and with German philosophy’s Bildung 
tradition. Specifically, Fairfield characterizes Dewey as reconceiving education as 
Bildung, which Dewey defined as “the conscious and deliberate formation of hu-
man personality through assimilation of the spiritual products of the past.”3 Fair-
field characterizes Dewey’s idea of experience as critical to Dewey’s groundbreak-
ing educational arguments about curriculum and knowledge. He situates this idea 
in the history of Enlightenment thinking and philosophical empiricism. Fairfield 
also likens Dewey’s ideas to phenomenological philosophy, noting that both reject 
empiricists’ ideas about subjectivity and mind. Similarly, both emphasize inten-
tionality, consciousness’s implication in the world, and experience’s continuity. In 
education, Dewey’s idea of experience should lead educators away from traditional 
teaching practice and toward the inculcation of intellectual virtues such as flex-
ibility, open-mindedness, and originality. In other words, this idea implies that 
education has more than instrumental value. Fairfield contends that Gadamer’s 
philosophy in particular can extend this implication into a critique of technique 
or scientific method—a critique that Dewey did not pursue. Drawing himself on 
the Bildung tradition, Fairfield argues that Dewey might have also written more 
about experience’s dialectical and narrative qualities.
Chapter 3 compares and contrasts Dewey’s and Heidegger’s accounts of 
thinking. Through this treatment, Fairfield sharpens his critique of Dewey’s com-
mitment to scientific method. Both Dewey and Heidegger “sought to reconceive 
in an essentially phenomenological way the basic nature of human thought, iden-
tifying its intimate connection with practice, language, and culture as well as its 
relation to science.”4 However, while Dewey believed that scientific habits of mind 
were applicable to human problems, Heidegger was not so sanguine. The German 
philosopher denied the relevance of scientific reasoning to philosophical thought 
and practical problem solving. Fairfield argues that Heidegger’s idea of meditative 
thinking is superior to Dewey’s method of intelligence. Missing in Dewey’s account 
are Heidegger’s emphases on questioning, on dwelling in preliminaries, and on po-
eticizing. Fairfield argues that Heidegger’s philosophy can illuminate how thinking 
is “experimental in a way or to a degree that Dewey did not see.”5 He argues that 
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such illumination is particularly needed in thinking on education, which is overly 
beholden to science and its methods.
Chapters 4 through 9 detail the implications of Fairfield’s Deweyan educa-
tional philosophy for teaching in the humanities. Each of these chapters also pairs 
Dewey with another thinker, comparing their positions on some key aspect of the 
discipline under discussion. Thus, in Chapter 4, on “Teaching Philosophy: The 
Scholastic and the Thinker,” Fairfield notes that both Dewey and Nietzsche felt 
disdain for academic philosophy. He employs their criticisms to reinforce his own 
call for philosophy education “far beyond the obligations of the scholar or profes-
sional.”6 Despite their formulaic structure, the chapters in this part are fresh and 
distinct. They showcase the creative connections Fairfield makes between Dewey’s 
and other thinkers’ ideas. 
Taken as a group, the chapters in part 2 cohere around themes including 
indoctrination, discussion or dialogue, and understanding. In his remarks on reli-
gious education and ethics pedagogy, Fairfield echoes Dewey’s arguments against 
teaching as indoctrination, contending that schooling should provide experiences 
in which undirected growth is the goal. For Fairfield, a teacher’s key resource for 
promoting this kind of open-ended learning is class discussion or conversation, 
which Fairfield conceives on the model of dialogue. In Chapter 1, citing Gadamer, 
Fairfield likens education to a conversation. Fairfield’s later chapters make clear 
that class conversations form the core of humanities education. Drawing on stu-
dents’ interests in philosophy, ethics, and politics, case-based courses can frame 
problems for discussion, which allows students to exercise powers of critical think-
ing and judgment, to develop arguments, and to defend positions. By contrast, in 
history or literature, subjects whose material Fairfield treats as operating more 
directly on learners, instruction should emphasize understanding. In historical 
study, educators might take their cue from Dewey and Foucault, for whom re-
search and writing about the past offers insights on the present. In the terms of 
Ricoeur’s narrative theory, reading literature presents special opportunities for 
self-understanding and for understanding experience and subjectivity in narra-
tive terms. Indeed, Fairfield values literature more than all the other humanities 
subject matters for its capacity to aid students’ understanding to develop students’ 
actual interests, to foster social intelligence, and to illuminate the temporal struc-
ture of their educational experience.
Education After Dewey argues for a philosophy of education that begins in 
Dewey’s writings and ends with the concerns expressed by Continental European 
philosophers. Although its widely ranging arguments are schematic at best, the 
book offers an engaging and inventive map for what such an educational phi-
losophy might look like. Particularly effective are Fairfield’s couplings of Dewey’s 
educational ideas with other philosophers’ concepts. Most of these connections 
invite further research by scholars who might find them worth pursuing in more 
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specificity. In this direction, Fairfield’s statements about Dewey’s and Gadamer’s 
agreements deserve significant elaboration. It would also be helpful to explore, how-
ever, the dissonances between Dewey’s philosophy of education and Continental 
European educational thinking. Fairfield strongly emphasizes Dewey’s intellectual 
debt to G.W.F. Hegel. However, Dewey’s philosophy, including his educational phi-
losophy, was more complex than its Hegelian roots (even though Dewey admitted 
that Hegel had “left a permanent deposit in my thinking”).7 Moreover, Dewey’s 
commitment to inquiry was central to his educational thinking. Yet, Fairfield ne-
glects Dewey’s repeated defenses of commonsense and scientific modes of inquiry 
(as well as their consequences). Fairfield is correct in asserting that Dewey’s think-
ing shows affinities with continental philosophers—and that this is the case even 
though many have failed to observe them. Yet, the many differences that separate 
Dewey from these other thinkers should also be accounted for. In short, Fairfield’s 
work to link philosophical traditions deserves its own conversational rejoinder, 
which should contextualize and question this bridge-building project.
Finally, Fairfield’s approach to Dewey’s philosophy blocks creative thinking 
about how to specify the proper means for humanities education. Fairfield focuses 
attention on Dewey’s ideas about the ends of education, particularly in his discussion 
of intellectual virtues. Beyond praising free and open class discussion, however, Fair-
field does not tell the reader much about how students engage in the learning process. 
From his early advocacy for “learning-by-doing” in the Laboratory School to his later 
opposition to the “Great Books” approaches, Dewey was sensitive to the open-ended 
relation between educational means and ends. Fairfield’s acceptance of traditional 
humanities teaching methods—all the way down to the divisions between subject 
matters—indicates a failure to think through the wide range of possible futures for 
humanities education. Today, “experiential learning” often functions as a synonym 
for vocational education. In contrast, Dewey understood that practical activities fund 
learning and growth as purely contemplative pursuits seldom can. To be sure, no 
practical change in classroom activities can alone improve poor humanities instruc-
tion. Better educational philosophy, as Fairfield has cogently argued, is also sorely 
needed. However, an improved philosophy of education will certainly be hobbled if 
we neglect Dewey’s important contributions to thinking in terms of means and ends. 
Much remains to be said about how Dewey can inspire humanities educa-
tors—as well as humanities students—to reconstruct the activities of teaching and 
learning in this traditional area of academic inquiry. As part of this project, it will 
be important to engage those influential schools of philosophy and social theory 
that Fairfield’s book highlights. Education After Dewey provides much-needed 
resources for those who wish to reform humanities education—a project Dewey 
described in 1911 as among the most urgent in educational practice.8 For this rea-
son, Fairfield’s book is a significant contribution to the current literature in Dewey 
studies and philosophy of education. 
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